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In many sports, it is common for top coaching positions to be held by former players;
however, despite the natural progression in many sports for skilled players to become high
level coaches, we have little understanding of how playing may develop useful skills for
coaching. In this study we considered perceptual-cognitive skill across groups of high and
low-skilled soccer players and soccer coaches. A range of perceptual-cognitive variables
was measured in an attempt to capture the diverse skills related to expertise in sport and
coaching. Generally, results highlighted similarities between coaches and players on some
tasks and differences on others.
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INTRODUCTION
The path to coaching expertise is not well understood. On the one
hand, there has been considerable research exploring the art and
science of coaching, in particular the work of Smith and Smoll
(see Smith and Smoll, 2007; Smoll and Smith, 2010 for reviews of
this work). Most studies in this area consider the specific behaviors
demonstrated by the expert coach (for example, see Horton et al.,
2005), typically showing that expert coaching is characterized by
meticulous planning of practices so that training reflects the spe-
cific needs and objectives of the athletes and team. On the other
hand, although interesting, Abraham and Collins (1998) argue
that this type of research has limited utility because it does not
provide tangible information for improving coach development,
particularly given the considerable time constraints involved in
elite-level coaching where decisions often need to be made rapidly
and accurately.
A limited number of studies have also considered the specific
cognitive (as opposed to behavioral) qualities that define the expert
coach. For instance, Vergeer and Lyle (2009) considered decision-
making of gymnastic coaches to determine whether competency
improved with increasing experience. They had coaches consider
a specific scenario (i.e., participation of an injured athlete at a
competition) and analyzed their responses. More skilled coaches
showed more extensive and complex decision-making strategies,
a higher number of statements and a deeper (i.e., less superficial)
focus of attention when compared with less-skilled coaches. Stud-
ies such as these add to our understanding of the acquisition of
coaching skill; however, our understanding is far from complete.
To complicate this discussion further, coaches have multiple
roles in athlete training and development. Brack (2002) discussed
the different requirements of team sport coaches noting three roles
that a coach has to fill, each with its own specific competences. For
example, in the “Trainer” role coaches have to demonstrate field
competence while in the “Manager” role a coach needs to have
strategic knowledge. Clearly, the role of the coach is multifaceted
and variable, and understanding the process(es) of coach devel-
opment is important for facilitating the development of the next
generation of coaches.
In many sports, it is common for top coaching positions to
be held by former players; however, despite this progression, we
have little understanding of how playing may develop useful skills
for coaching. Like other experts, skilled coaches appear to develop
their capabilities over years of involvement. Schinke et al. (1995)
suggested that in addition to developing through coaching experi-
ence, coach development could occur if they spent significant time
as an athlete. Gilbert et al. (2006) examined the development pro-
files of successful coaches from a range of sports and competition
levels, and presented preliminary data indicating these coaches
had several 1000 h of accumulated time spent participating as an
athlete (i.e., “pre-experience”). Subsequent to involvement as an
athlete, they spent many 100 s of hours each year directly involved
in coach-related activities (athlete training, competition, adminis-
tration, and coach education; Gilbert et al., 2006). It is possible that
participation as an athlete augments the development of skills nec-
essary as an expert coach. Studies of athletes have provided a wealth
of information about the skills underpinning elite performance in
various sports (cf. Abernethy et al., 2007; Mann et al., 2007). Differ-
ences between skilled and less-skilled athletes have been found in
components of perception, knowledge, and decision-making (Bar-
Eli et al., 2011) and these skill differences may have some role in
“creating” the expert coach. For example, the ability to rapidly read
patterns of information on the field of play (a hallmark of skilled
performance as an athlete; see Hodges et al., 2006, for a review)
could be valuable for making quick decisions regarding the most
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effective offensive or defensive strategy. Unfortunately, few stud-
ies have considered the specific perceptual-cognitive capabilities
of skilled coaches and how these relate to the capabilities demon-
strated by skilled athletes. Understanding these relationships has
the potential to improve our understanding of expert coach devel-
opment and further elucidate the value of time spent as an athlete.
A range of methods has been used to uncover the difference in
perceptual-cognitive capabilities of skilled athletes. For example,
the Flicker-Paradigm, developed by Rensink et al. (1997), examines
“change blindness,” a phenomenon where participants attempt to
perceive subtle changes in a visual display. Experts typically per-
form better on these types of tasks than novices (cf. Werner and
Thies, 2000) but only in scenes where information is structured
in meaningful ways (cf. Werner and Thies, 2000; Reingold et al.,
2001). Similar results have been found in a range of domains using
various pattern recognition tests; differences between experts and
novices are restricted to scenes with medium to high levels of
structure (as compared to unstructured scenes; e.g., chess, Simon
and Chase, 1973; snooker, Abernethy, 1994; soccer, Williams et al.,
1993, 2006; Williams and Davids, 1998; Ward and Williams, 2003).
In addition to perceptual capabilities, skilled athletes have a
more sophisticated knowledge structure than less-skilled athletes.
For example, a series of studies by Allard and colleagues (see
Allard et al., 1993 for a review) considered differences in declar-
ative knowledge between coaches, players, and judges. They were
able to show among athletes and judges/officials in figure skating,
diving (e.g., Allard and Starkes, 1991), and basketball (e.g., Deakin
and Allard, 1992) that different types of declarative knowledge are
required for different sporting tasks. More specifically, declarative
knowledge is specific to an individual’s role in the sport, differing
between coaches, players, and judges.
An important distinction in understanding skilled perform-
ers’ decision-making processes relates to intuitive (i.e., automatic)
versus deliberative (i.e., explicit information processing) deci-
sions. Highly skilled athletes use both intuitive and deliberative
processes; in high game tempo situations, they are able to make
fast, intuitive, and accurate decisions, but when given the opportu-
nity they are also able to deliberate this decision and propose other
options (cf. Hogarth, 2001). Although there is some disagreement
about the value of deliberation in decision-making (see Raab and
Reimer, 2007), it appears that highly skilled athletes are superior
at both intuitive and deliberative decision-making.
The research summarized above indicates skill-based differ-
ences among performers in dynamic, time-constrained sports.
Given that elite coaches often spend a significant amount of time
as athletes, it is important to determine whether the perceptual-
cognitive skills developed by elite athletes over the course of their
career have any relevance to being an exceptional coach. Our study
considers differences on a range of perceptual-cognitive character-
istics from varying levels of information processing among high-
and low-skilled soccer coaches and high- and low-skilled play-
ers. Moreover, we considered whether the coaches’ skill in this
area is explained by experience as a player. Because there are few
studies on this topic, our hypotheses were rather preliminary. We
assumed that there would be differences between coaches and play-
ers, particularly at higher levels of information processing (e.g.,
decision-making and strategizing; extended on the basis of Bar-Eli
et al., 2011). Additionally, we hypothesized expertise differences at
all levels of information processing. The interaction of both should
become relevant in tasks that demand decisions and strategies but
not for task of pure knowledge and perception.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 73 males participated in this study, organized into two
player and two coach groups. The “low-skilled players” group
included 18 relatively inexperienced soccer players with an aver-
age of<300 h, SD= 388, and 1.9 years, SD= 2.4, of soccer playing
experience and no coaching experience. The average age of par-
ticipants in this group was 25.2 years, SD= 7.2. The “high-skilled
players” group included 18 currently active soccer players of vary-
ing performance levels. They had played soccer in a club, typically
at the amateur level, for an average of 3713 h, SD= 1648, and
17.2 years, SD= 3.0, demonstrating significant experience as a soc-
cer player. Similar to the low-skilled player group, this group had
no experience as a coach. The average age of participants in this
group was 26.1 years, SD= 6.9.
The“low-skilled coaches”group consisted of 17 currently active
soccer coaches with an average playing career of 5540 h,SD= 3558,
and 23.5 years, SD= 7.4, with an average coaching career of 5160 h,
SD= 3439, and 11.7 years, SD= 6.7. Participants in this group did
not play at a level higher than the highest amateur level and were
currently coaching at a low amateur level. The average age of this
group was 40.0 years, SD= 9.3. The “high-skilled coaches” group
was made up of 20 soccer coaches currently coaching at a high
level. They had an average playing career of 5465 h, SD= 3408,
and 23.0 years, SD= 8.9, generally at the highest amateur level, and
a coaching career of 6670 h, SD= 4722, and 11.7 years, SD= 5.6,
at the highest amateur level and above. Their average age was
35.5 years, SD= 9.8. All participants provided informed consent
prior to the study and the study was conducted in accordance
with the revised Ethical declaration of Helsinki (World Medical
Association, 2008).
APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE
A range of perceptual-cognitive variables was measured in an
attempt to capture the diverse skills related to expertise in sport
(Bar-Eli et al., 2011). All tests were presented on a notebook with
a 15.1′′ screen (IBM R31) and are described below.
Halftime speech test
Participants viewed a length of video from a 2006 game between a
German first division team and one from the Turkish first division.
This game was chosen because it was unlikely to be known by the
participants. The play-by-play commentary was removed from the
video. The participants’ task was to view the seven and a half min-
utes of play that occurred immediately before the halftime break.
After viewing the segment, participants were instructed to put
themselves in the position of head coach of the team that was zero
to one behind at halftime, and deliver the halftime speech to their
team. Speeches were recorded, transcribed, and evaluated using
content analysis. A two-category system similar to that used by
Hagemann et al. (2008) was used. Two language and sport experts
assigned the statement of the participants to categories using the
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qualitative analysis technique of formal structuring (cf. Mayring,
2008). First, the addressee of the statement was considered to
determine whether the statement was directed to an individual
player, a group of players, or the whole team. Second, the content
of the statement was considered to determine whether the content
reflected instruction, anger/frustration, question, criticism, praise,
motivation, or utterances without specific meanings. The fre-
quency of utterances across these categories provided information
about differences in the behavior among the four groups.
Forced-choice pattern recognition test
The ability to rapidly recognize offensive and defensive structures
may be important for informing the type of complex and rapid
decision-making necessary for high performance coaching. To this
end, participants completed a forced-choice test immediately after
the halftime speech. This test was used to determine participants’
skill at recognizing playing patterns. Participants viewed 10 scenes
of 10 s, five of which were from the video they had just seen prior
to the halftime speech task. The other five were from other parts of
the same game. Any identifying information such as elapsed time,
score, or commentary was deleted and the scenes were presented in
random order. Participants were required to identify scenes they
had seen previously with recognition performance measured as
the number of correctly recognized scenes. To put the participants
under time pressure, they only had 10 s time to make their decision.
Decision-making test
Our decision-making test utilized a similar approach to that
described by Johnson and Raab (2003) for handball and can be
classified in the family of Guilford tests (Christensen et al., 1960;
Berger and Guilford, 1969). The test consisted of 15 (12 test plus
3 training) medium and high structured video scenes taken from
four games from the German first division in 2006. Scenes were
filmed from the perspective of the middle line high up in the
ranks and the number of players in the scene ranged from 10 to
18. Three videos were used for familiarization with the task and
the others were presented in random order to the coaches. Partic-
ipants were provided with a portable recorder and a microphone
and their answers were immediately transcribed. After viewing
approximately 10 s of video the screen “froze” at a point where
a decision had to be made. At this point, participants provided
one quick first decision (=intuition) followed by generation of as
many realistic options as possible (=option generation). After the
last option was named, they were asked to identify which one they
would see as the best option (=deliberation). Participants’ deci-
sions were rated on a scale from 1 to 10 by two independent expert
soccer coaches. One had been working as a coach for 17 years and
had the second highest coaching license in Germany, while the
other had 7 years of experience and the third highest coaching
license. The average of these rankings determined the quality of
the options, which allowed for the examination of not only the
number of total options and the quality of first and best options
but also the consistency between first and best options.
Pattern-recall test
The pattern-recall task consisted of 18 scenes with durations
between 8 and 12 s, with the number of players displayed rang-
ing from 7 to 13. Participants were instructed that they would see
short videos and that their task was to remember the location of
all players from the very last frame presented. Following the video
segment, participants saw a blank white screen and the task was
to designate the last locations of players from the team using the
left button of the mouse for one team and the right button for the
other team. They were told to be as exact as possible on the location
of the players as they were last seen in the video. If they thought
they made a mistake, they were able to easily erase and relocate
this player on the screen. After they were done with one video,
they started the next. No time pressure was included and accuracy
was determined as the number of players recalled compared to the
number of players presented on screen.
Flicker-test
The Flicker-test is a common method of exploring change blind-
ness capabilities within a scene (cf. Rensink et al., 1997). Eighteen
scenes from first division German soccer games were manipu-
lated after approximately 10 s of video. At this point, the video
frame froze then changed to a black screen before returning to a
frame that appeared identical to the previous; the only difference
between first frame and the next was that one player was removed
using spatial occlusion. The task for the participants was to point
out the player removed from the scene.
PROCEDURE
Data collection took between 1.5 and 2 h per participant. To get
participants used to the Flicker and pattern-recall tests familiar-
ization trails were used before each of these tests. The test elements
were counterbalanced to avoid serial order effects and data collec-
tion took place in various quiet locations where participants could
complete the tasks without interruption.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Statistical analyses were conducted separately for each dependent
variable. Analyses of variance were conducted to test for dif-
ferences between groups with the more liberal Tukey-procedure
used for post hoc analyses. For two tests (Flicker and Pattern-
recall), structure was added as the repeated measure. Greenhouse–
Geisser-adjustments were used when the precondition of variance
homogeneity was violated and the alpha-level was set to 0.05 for all
analyses. Both alpha-level and effect size (f) were used when inter-
preting differences among the groups. SPSS 18.0 and G∗Power
3.1.10 (Faul et al., 2007) were used for all analyses.
RESULTS
The results are generally presented in the order of the type of infor-
mation processing that occurred during the task. We start with the
Flicker-test, followed by the forced-choice-tests, pattern-recall test,
and decision-making test, ending with results from the halftime
speech.
FLICKER-TEST
A between groups (groups) repeated measures (structure) ANOVA
revealed significant differences for structure, F(2, 69)= 75.22,
p< 0.01, f= 1.04, and group F(3, 69)= 3.46, p= 0.02, f= 0.39.
As seen in Table 1, reaction times increased with less structure.
Post hoc tests demonstrated significant differences between the
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low structured scenes and the medium, D= 3345.4, p= 0.02, and
high structured ones, D= 3067.9, p= 0.02, while the medium
and highly structured scenes did not differ. For the group main
effect, post hoc tests showed differences only between the high-
skilled players and the low-skilled coaches, D= 1656.4, p= 0.02.
No significant interaction between the factors was revealed, F(6,
138)= 1.48, p= 0.19, f= 0.25, 1−β= 0.29.
FORCED-CHOICE PATTERN RECOGNITION TEST
For the forced-choice pattern recognition test, significant differ-
ences between groups were revealed, F(3, 72)= 6.43, p< 0.01,
f= 0.46. As seen in Figure 1, there were clear differences between
the less-skilled players and the other three groups. Post hoc tests
confirmed differences between less-skilled players and high-skilled
players, D= 1.61, p= 0.01, less-skilled players and less-skilled
coaches, D= 1.67, p= 0.01, and less-skilled players and high-
skilled coaches, D= 2.02, p< 0.01, but did not show any difference
between the three other groups.
PATTERN-RECALL TEST
A between subject (group) repeated measures (structure) ANOVA
revealed a significant interaction between both factors, F(5.57,
128.19)= 3.31, p< 0.01, f= 0.39, as well as a main effect for struc-
ture, F(1.86, 128.19)= 40.99, p< 0.01, f= 0.77, but showed no
significant differences between groups, F(3, 69)= 1.72, p= 0.17,
f= 0.27, 1−β= 0.45 on the pattern-recall test. Repeated within-
subject contrasts of the interaction between group and structured
revealed the interaction was between medium and low structure
scenes, F(3, 69)= 3.39, p= 0.02, but not between medium and
high structured scenes, F(3, 69)= 0.57, p= 0.63. As can be seen
in Figure 2, the coaches showed deteriorated performance in low
structure scenes compared to the players.
DECISION-MAKING TEST
In the decision-making test (Table 2), significant differences
between groups were revealed in the number of options generated,
F(3, 72)= 10.63, p< 0.01, f= 0.57. The difference between both
of the player groups and both of the coaches groups was signifi-
cant. The low-skilled players differed from the low-skilled coaches,
D= 0.46, p< 0.01 and from the high-skilled coaches, D= 0.31,
p< 0.01. Similarly, the high-skilled players differed from the low-
skilled coaches, D= 0.41, p< 0.01, as well as from the high-skilled
coaches D= 0.27, p= 0.02. Focusing on the quality of the options,
there was neither a significant difference in the quality of the









M SD M SD M SD M SD
High structured scenes 4961 342 4766 342 5473 352 4983 325
Medium structured scenes 5168 372 4605 372 6111 383 5459 353
Low structured scenes 7802 707 7305 707 10061 727 7779 670
FIGURE 1 | Differences between player and coach groups on number of correctly recognized scenes (and their standard error) in the
Forced-Choice-test.
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FIGURE 2 | Differences between player and coach groups in scenes with varying structure on number of players reported (and their standard error) in
the Pattern-Recall test.









M SD M SD M SD M SD
Number of options 2.0 0.3 2.1 0.3 2.5 0.4 2.3 0.4
Quality of the first choice 7.2 1.0 7.6 0.6 7.4 0.9 7.5 0.7
Quality of the final choice 7.0 1.0 7.5 0.7 7.9 1.0 7.6 0.6
Average option quality 6.2 0.6 6.7 0.4 6.6 0.4 6.6 0.4
Consistency between first choice and final choice 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.2
The quality of the generated options was ranked by two experts on a scale from 1 – not recommended to 10 – optimal option.
first choice between the groups, F(3, 69)= 0.74, p= 0.53, f= 0.18,
1−β= 0.21, nor in the quality of the final choice between the
groups, F(3, 69)= 2.25, p= 0.09, f= 0.31, 1−β= 0.57, although
in this latter case, the effect size was of moderate strength and the
alpha value was approaching significance. A significant difference
in the mean quality of all options was detected, F(3, 72)= 3.26,
p= 0.03, f= 0.35, but the post hoc tests showed no significant
differences between the groups. The consistency between the First
and Final choice was also not significant, F(3, 69)= 0.38, p= 0.77,
f= 0.13, 1−β= 0.12.
HALFTIME SPEECH TEST
The results of the analysis of the halftime speeches showed signifi-
cant differences in both analyzing steps (Table 3). The word counts
between the expertise groups differed significantly, F(3, 72)= 6.79,
p< 0.01, f= 0.47, and post hoc tests showed that the low-skilled
players differed from both groups of coaches. The difference
between the low-skilled players and the low-skilled coaches was
D= 170.3, p= 0.01, and the difference between the low-skilled
players and the high-skilled coaches was D= 188.9, p< 0.01. Also,
the number of statements was significantly different between the
four expertise groups, F(3, 73)= 4.00, p= 0.01, f= 0.38. Here
the low-skilled players had a significantly lower number of state-
ments than the high-skilled players, D= 4.56, p= 0.04, the low-
skilled coaches, D= 5.12, p= 0.02, and the high-skilled coaches,
D= 4.55, p= 0.04.
The analyses of the addressors of the statements show signifi-
cant differences in the Greenhouse–Geisser test, F(2, 69)= 182.30,
p< 0.01, f= 1.08. Most comments were addressed to the team, fol-
lowed by groups of players and then individual players. There was
an interaction between the participant groups and the addressors,
F(2, 138)= 182.27, p< 0.01, f= 0.48. Every group addressed the
team most often but the low-skilled coaches and the high-skilled
players had a greater number of statements addressed to the team
www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 129 | 5
Gründel et al. Expertise in coaches









M SD M SD M SD M SD
Word count 150.7 70.6 216.8 102.5 321.0 210.8 339.6 164.1
Statement count 8.0 4.1 12.6 4.9 13.1 5.8 12.6 5.3
Instruction 2.3 0.6 3.7 0.6 3.8 0.6 3.3 0.5
Anger 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Question 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1
Information 1.1 0.2 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.3 1.1 0.2
Criticism 1.7 0.5 3.2 0.5 5.5 0.5 5.6 0.5
Praise 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2
Motivation 0.6 0.2 1.7 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2
Talking 1.4 0.3 1.6 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.5 0.3
Individual player 0.4 0.3 1.2 0.3 1.2 0.3 1.1 0.3
Group of players 1.5 0.5 1.6 0.5 2.1 0.5 2.7 0.4
Team 6.1 1.0 9.7 1.0 9.8 1.0 8.8 0.9
The first section of the table describes the number of words and statements.The second section provides information about the average number of statements from
each type and the third section, the average number of statements directed to each of the different categories of addressee.
than the other two groups. For the statements addressed to groups
of players, high-skilled coaches addressed them most often fol-
lowed by the low-skilled coaches and the high-skilled players, with
low-skilled players addressing groups of players the least. Interest-
ingly, low-skilled coaches did not address individual players very
often. High-skilled players and low- and high-skilled coaches had
about the same number of statements addressed to an individual
player.
There were similar results for the types of utterances. There was
a significant difference between the eight types of utterances, F(7,
69)= 75.2, p< 0.01, f= 1.08, and an interaction between the type
of utterance and the participant groups, F(10.66, 245.12)= 5.39,
p< 0.01, f= 0.48. Perhaps the most interesting result was the
number of statements belonging to the criticism category. The
coaches, in particular the high-skilled coaches, criticized more
than the other groups, whereas praise was used more often by
the two player groups. Motivational statements were used more
by the high-skilled players than all other groups. Another inter-
esting result related to the instruction category, which was used
more often by low-skilled coaches and high-skilled players than by
high-skilled coaches and low-skilled players. Results for the other
statement categories were similar across the four groups.
DISCUSSION
This study examined the perceptual-cognitive abilities of soc-
cer coaches and players of different skill levels. Our exploratory
hypotheses were that there would be differences between players
and coaches as well as between expertise levels across the different
information processing outcomes. Generally, results highlighted
similarities between coaches and players on some tasks and differ-
ences (particularly compared to low-skilled players) on others. For
example, there were no significant differences between the coach
and player groups on pattern-recall or on the mean quality of
decisions made during the decision-making task. Conversely, in
the pattern recognition test, low-skill players differed from high-
skill players and both groups of coaches. As in previous research
(cf. Ward and Williams, 2003), there was some evidence that the
number of correctly recognized scenes increased with increas-
ing skill but, surprisingly, high-skill players were similar to the
coaching groups, which did not differ.
Collectively, these results indicate some similarities between the
perceptual and cognitive skills used by athletes and those used by
coaches. On the one hand, the similarities between both groups
of coaches and the high-skill players suggests there may be some
transfer between skills developed as a player and those required
for coaching, although this finding requires further exploration.
It is possible that these perceptual-cognitive skills are “carryovers”
from their athlete careers; Schorer and Baker (2009) found remark-
able stability of perceptual skills in athletes despite years of non-
involvement. All of our coaches had considerable pre-experience
playing soccer, and as a result it was not possible with the cur-
rent design to determine whether these skills carryover from their
playing career or whether they result from coaching experience.
To overcome this issue, future studies should try to utilize coaches
with no prior playing experience in the respective domain. This
was not possible in the current study, perhaps due to the unique
nature of development of German soccer coaches.
On the Flicker-test, low-skilled coaches were significantly dif-
ferent from high-skilled players, but differences in accuracy and
reaction time were not as large as expected. It is possible that
our test was too easy (all groups had very high accuracy), there-
fore not providing sufficient challenge to the groups so that
more skilled performers could demonstrate superiority. In the
reaction time data, there was better performance in segments
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with increased structure, supporting previous research (Hodges
et al., 2006) indicating a role for structure in information recall.
However, differences among the groups were not affected by
changes in structure, which is counter to our hypothesis that
more skilled performers would be markedly superior to less-skilled
performers in scenes with more structure. The high-skilled play-
ers had the shortest reaction time, but low-skilled players were
similar to high-skilled coaches, with low-skilled coaches as the
slowest group. These results are contrary to those reported be
Werner and Thies (2000), which showed lower change blind-
ness in experts. It is possible that the variation between the
present results and those of Werner and Thies are due to the
different ages of the groups in our study. The group with the
slowest reaction time was also the oldest (40.0 years) and given
the strong correlation between reaction time and age (in the
present study r =−0.82) age may have confounded our analy-
ses. If possible, future studies should consider re-examining these
relationships with groups that are homogenous for age. Given the
natural progression in many sports where coaching careers happen
after careers of varying lengths as a player, this recommendation,
although valuable for improving study design, is likely impossible
to achieve.
There were also some clear differences between player and
coach groups. In the decision-making task, coaches reported more
options than players but there were no differences between the
skill groups. Similarly, low-skill players had a lower word count
than both coach groups on the halftime speech task. There was
also a difference between low-skill players and low-skill coaches
on the number of statements on this task. Additionally, coaches’
better performances on aspects of the halftime speech highlight
the specific domains of expertise distinguishing coaching skill.
Surprisingly, there were few differences between the high- and
low-skill coaching groups, but when they did occur, they were
typically on variables more closely associated with coaching skill
such as the halftime task.
Taken together, these preliminary results allow us to develop
a working hypothesis for future work. It seems that in lower lev-
els of information processing, such as the more perceptual tasks,
players outperform coaches, especially when the coaches have lit-
tle or less qualified experience as players, while tasks with higher
demands on information processing, like strategizing or decision-
making, are more specifically related to coaching skill. Although
this is obviously quite preliminary, it seems plausible that play-
ers would use more implicit ways of information processing in
contrast to coaches who need to be very explicit in their process-
ing. Future studies should test these constructs in addition to the
already proposed comparison groups.
Although this study provides important insight into the quali-
ties of skilled coaches and how these factors are different or similar
to those of skilled athletes, several methodological issues remain.
First, how do we determine the relevance of different forms of
experience to the development of expert coaches? The average
years of coaching experience of highly skilled coaches in the cur-
rent study was 11.7, SD= 5.6 with an average of 6670 h of coaching
experience; however, if we include time as a player, years of expe-
rience increases to 35 and the hours of experience (i.e., playing
and coaching) increases to 12135 h, SD= 6002.6. Most models
of skill acquisition focus on the role of domain-specific forms of
training/practice (e.g., deliberate practice); the results of this study
suggest that other forms of training are relevant for acquisition of
coaching skill. Moreover, within the field of coaching there are
various roles individuals can fill (e.g., assistant coach, technical
coach), with head coach likely representing an elite stage of coach
development. Currently, we have very little understanding of the
value associated with time spent in junior coaching positions. A
second, but related issue is the difficulty in determining the “qual-
ity” of a coach. The indicators mentioned above provide very gross
indicators of skill development but coach quality or skill is often
determined by other factors. For instance, the performances of ath-
letes under a coach’s supervision are presumed to reflect a coach’s
capability; similarly, a coach’s level of certification (e.g., the level of
their coaching license in the present study) gives another indicator
of coach “quality.” Unlike high performance athletes where there
are clear performance standards for determining level of skill or
quality of performance, there is no standard definition of coach-
ing expertise, and as a result it is difficult to determine whether
the differences in experience, performance level and qualification
between the low- and high-skilled coaches are sufficient to call the
high-skilled coaches “experts.”
A final methodological issue relates to the external validity of
the study results. For example, the videos used during data collec-
tion were from television footage, where the camera position was
on the side of the court or close to the center-line. This perspective
is not normally used by either coach or athlete, which may limit
the ecological validity of the study’s results. The negative effect of
a changing viewing position was previously noted in a decision-
making-soccer-test (Petit and Ripoll, 2008) and as a result, further
research is necessary to confirm these findings in other samples
using different methodologies.
Collectively, these results highlight coach- and player-specific
perceptual-cognitive capabilities. Moreover, they also showed that
recognition performance in the Forced-Choice-test and aspects
of the halftime speech were specifically related to coaching skill.
These results provide a useful starting point for further research
examining aspects of perceptual-cognitive expertise in coaching.
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